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ON the 7th day of August, A. D. 1876, in the city of Chicago,
Illinois, Alexander Sullivan shot Francis Hanford at his own door,
for which he was subsequently indicted for murder, and put upon
trial at the ensuing October Term of the Criminal Court of Cook
county, before the Hon. W. K. MCALLISTER and a jury, which
trial resulted in a disagreement of the jury, and upon a second trial
had in March 1877, before the same judge, the defendant was acquitted.
The circumstances attending the homicide, the prominence of the
parties connected with it, and the unusual scenes that were witnessed
in court upon the first trial, coupled with the fierce denunciation of
the conduct of the presiding judge which was made by the daily
press, all conduced to create great excitement in the public mind,
which culminated at length in the disagreement of the jury, and in
the presentation to the judge -who presided of a numerously-signed
petition requesting him to resign his office.
The occasion of this extraordinary proceeding was the fact that
it had beeif noticed that the judge during the trial had ruled constantly in favor of the defendant; had refused to give to the jury
the statutory law as to manslaughter without comment, at the request
of the prosecution; and had given skilfully drawn instructions to
the jury of his own drafting, putting the case in the best possible
light for the defendant, and had permitted the crowd during the
trial to applaud, or otherwise audibly express their approval or disVOL. XXV.-49
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approval of the sentiments of the respective counsel engaged in the
case, which was carried to such length as caused the judge from the
bench to say that lie was powerless to prevent it, a condition of
things that no circumstances can excuse, much less justify, without
sweeping away the last vestige of the dignity and respect which
should surround the administration of justice, and substituting for
the law itself the will of a mob.
The acquittal of the defendant upon the second trial has helped
to create a wide-spread belief among the people, either that in the
conduct of these trials justice was outraged and the administration
of the law perverted, or else that the law in this country gives but
little protection to human life.
To properly understand the case, a statement of the leading facts
is essential.
The defendant, Alexander Sullivan, for about three years previous to the homicide, had been secretary of the Board of Public Works
of the city of Chicago. His wife, Iargaret Sullivan, to whom he
had been married about two years, was a professional writer for the
daily papers, and both were recognised as reputable members of
society.
Upon the afternoon of the '7th of August 1876, which was the
day of the homicide, the Common Council. of the city of Chicago
was in session, and before it was then pending the question of the
confirmation of five members of the Board of Education; while the
council was so in session, the defendant went from his office in the
same building to the ante-chamber of the council, and was told as he
entered it by several friends, that an attack infamous and brutal
in its character had just been made in the council upon his (Sullivan's) wife. He at first supposed it was a speech made, but soon
learned that it had been presented to the council in the form of an
anonymous communication by one of the aldermen. Sullivan went
to him and told him that he was the husband of the lady involved,
and that he had been informed that the attack was infamous in its
implications, and consequently claimed the right to know who -wrote
it. The alderman replied that at a proper time he could give the
author. More words passed between them, and Sullivan became
somewhat excited, using harsh words, but on being told that the
article did not involve his wife's reputation, he became more quiet
and apologized for his hasty language. Shortly after, the subject
was renewed in the ante-room in the presence of Sullivan, between
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the alderman and one of the board of education who had also been
attacked in the article. Sullivan again became excited and told
the alderman if he refused to give the name of the author of
the communication he would hold him responsible. Whereupon lie
was told that the author was Francis Hanford, and was asked if he
knew him, to which Sullivan replied that he did not, and asked the
alderman, who said lie had no particular acquaintance with him,
how he could publish an attack to the world upon the character of a
lady without having any particular acquaintance with the author
of the calumny; to which he replied that he considered the source
reliable and trustworthy.
After the adjournment of the council the great impropriety of
having presented publicly such a communication to the council was
canvassed by several members in the presence of Sullivan. The
latter then went to the reporters' desk to see the article, but could
not do so, except in detached pieces, it being then in separate
sheets and in the hands of several reporters. Sullivan, however,
saw and copied from the first page these iWords : "The instigator
and engineer-in-chief of all the deviltry connected with the legislation of the board is Mrs. Sullivan, the wife of the Secretary of
the Board of Public Works. Her influence with Mayor Colvin -was
proved by her getting Bailey dismissed and her husband appointed
in his stead." It does not appear that Sullivan saw any more of the
article previous to the homicide, although he tried to do so, but the
defence claimed that he left the council chamber impressed by what
he had been told with the idea that the article in some of its portions inferentially charged his wife with criminal intimacy with
the mayor of the city.
The remainder of the article in fact charged in effect that there
was a corrupt ring in the school board, naming the members of
such ring, detailing various acts and measures of the board of education which were charged to be intended to cripple the schools and
which were therein attributed to the influence of such ring, and
then charged Mrs. Sullivan with being the chief instigator of the
alleged ring, as before stated, and that she was the secret agent of
the .CathoIic church, and was seeking the overthrow of the common
schools of the city. The victim of the homicide, Francis Hanford,
)vas the principal of one of the public schools of Chicago, and had
been assistant superintendent of all the schools, which position he
had resigned. It was charged by the defence that he wrote the
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anonymous article for the purpose of defeating the confirmation of
the five members of the board whose nominations were then pending, in order to secure five other men, with the hope that this
change in a body of fifteen would effect the restoration of himself
to his former position of superintendent. But this seems as far as
the evidence disclosed to be founded only on supposition.*
From the council chamber Sullivan went to his house. His wife
bad been sick for several days, and had only left her room the day
previous. Some three years before she had been seriously injured
by an accident in a street car from which she had not recovered,
and this left her predisposed to nervous excitability to an unusual
degree. Sullivan told her she had been assailed that afternoon in
the council chamber and read to her the portion of the article he
had copied, and she insisted that the article must not be published
in the newspapers. As she was not acquainted with Mr. Hanford
it was suggested that the article might have originated in a mistake,
and it was therefore best to see Mr. Hanford and obtain an explanation, and as upon inquiry it was ascertained that he lived but a
few blocks away in the same street, it was arranged that they should
visit there together, which was done. It should be borne in mind,
however, that this portion of the case, as to the purpose in visiting
Mr. Hanford, rested mainly upon the testimony of the defendant.
On reaching the residence of Mr. Hanford, about seven o'clock
in the evening of the 7th of August last, the defendant, Sullivan,
and his brother stepped from the carriage door across a little grass
plat, some six feet wide, upon a sidewalk of nearly the same width,
and inquired of Mrs. Hanford where her husband, the deceased, was.
She immediately pointed him out, standing near by, conversing with
an acquaintance, while she was herself sitting within a few feet of
him, upon the steps of their dwelling. The man standing by th6
side of Hanford left as Sullivan and his brother approached him.
Sullivan said, "My name is Sullivan; I am informed you arg the
author of a communication read in the common council this after
noon, which makes an attack, infamous in its nature, upon the
character of my wife." Hanford replied, "If I have made any
charges, I will substantiate them." "You deny then," said Sullivan, "being the author of the article ?" He replied, "I neither
deny nor afirm." Sullivan then said, "Alderman Van Osdel gave
your name as the author of the article." To which Hanford replied,
"If that is so, then you know already who the author is, and it is
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not necessary for me to confirm the information."

Sullivan then

read to Hanford a portion of the article, characterizing it as infamous and repeatedly demanded a retraction, which Hanford repeatedly refused to give, and in substance said, that he would prove the
truth of his communication when called upon at the proper time.
Sullivan said, "Now is the proper time." Hanford replied, "I
will be the judge as to the proper time." Being unable to get any
promise of retraction from Hanford, Sullivan became excited, called
Hanford a "dog," and knocked him down. Hanford was a man
inferior in size to Sullivan, in feeble health, and at the time unarmed,
while Sullivan was in the habit of carrying a revolver. From the
point of the striking of Hanford, there is some disagreement as to
what occurred. But as we understand the testimony, at this point
Mrs. Sullivan jumped out of her carriage, and called to her husband
"for God's sake not to get into a street quarrel, and not to hur
him," while a bystander, one McMullen, sei.ed hold of Sullivan
from behind, putting his right arm around Sullivan's neck, and
pulling him off or holding him back from Hanford. As Hanford
got up and threw his arms out, it is claimed, but controverted, that
he struck Mrs. Sullivan, who had approached near, and that she
exclaimed, "The scouidrel has struck me." At this juncture Sullivan was struggling to get away from McMullen, and Hanf6rd
came tow"rds them in a staggering manner with his hands raised
and open, while McMullen thrust his own body forward so as to
interpose it between Sullivan and Hanford, and extended his left
hand towards Hanford to keep him back, still retaining his hold
with his right arm around Sullivan's neck. Thereupon, Sullivan
drew his revolver from his right hip pocket, cocked it, thrust it past
the body of McMullen, and shot Hanford fatally in the abdomen,
when he was about six feet from him.
The defence assumed two positions: First, that the killing was
in se f-defence; secondly, that the defendant was justified in killing
Hanliord on account of the attack made upon his wife in the communication to the council and his refusal to retract it.
As to the first line of defence, admitting the full force of the rule
of law that if one be assaulted in such a way as to induce in him a
reasonable and well-grounded belief that he is actually in danger
of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm, he will be justified, under the influence of such apprehension, in defending himself even to the taking of the life of his assailant, and this whether
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the danger be real or only apparent; yet it is well nigh impossible
to believe that Sullivan could have had any reasonable apprehension
of great bodily harm either to himself or to his wife from Hanford,
even if he or his wife was struck by Hanford after having been
knocked down'himself. Besides, Sullivan sought the meeting, went
to it armed, and struck the first blow.
We had hitherto supposed it to be settled in Illinois, as elsewhere, that if a defendant in any way challenged a fight and went
to it armed, he could not afterwards maintain that in taking his
assailant's life he had acted in self-defence: Adams v. The People,
47 Ill. 876 ; Faiden v. Commonwealth, 12 Grat. (Va.) 717 ; Dock
v. Commonwealth, 21 Id. 912; Mitchell v. State, 22 Ga. 234;
People v. Stowcfer, 6 Cal. 405; Evans v. &ate, 44 Miss. 762;
Stewart v. State, 1 Ohio St. 66; State v. Stoffer, 15 Id. 47; State
v. JTays, 23 Mo. 308; State v. Stair, 38 Id. 270. Yet the court
instructed the jury that " if they believed from the evidence that
the defendant, in good faith and without any desire to provoke a
quarrel with or to otherwise injure or kill said Hanford, sought an
interview with said Hanford for a lawful and peaceable purpose,
and during said interview a quarrel ensued between said defendant
and said Hanford, and during said quarrel said defendant knocked
down said Hanford, and was then removed away from him by one
McMullen, and did not thereafter further attempt to strike or injure
said Hanford; and if the jury further believe from the evidence
that said Hanford followed up said defendant and sought to renew
or further prosecute the quarrel by attempting to strike or otherwise injure said defendant; this would not deprive the defendant
of the right of defending himself from such an assault on the part
of said Hanford."
Or, in other words, we suppose that it was
intended that the jury should infer that in these circumstances the
defendant had a right to shoot Hanford; whereas we think the law
to be that no such right exists, where, as in this case, there was no
cessation of the affray before its final termination and the defendant
being the first assailant had not himself withdrawn from the affray,
only as he was held back by a bystander: Stoffer v. State, 15 Ohio
St. 47. If the law were otherwise, as -said Lord HALE, "we should
have all cases of murder or manslaughter, by way of interpretation,
turned into se defendendo:" 1 Hale P. C. 482. Besides, the
second position of the defendant that he was justified in killing
Hanford is inconsistent with and overthrows the theory of self-
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defence, for it impliedly admits that the only reason for killing him
was because he and his wife had been wronged by the communication of Hanford to the council, and as he would not retract, therefore
he killed him. This brings us to a consideration of the question
whether the alleged provocation was a justification of the killing.
The admission in evidence of the communication to the council
and what was said to Sullivan about it, can be sustained upon the
ground of its tending to show what provocation Hanford had given,
and the condition of Sullivan's mind; but if its admissibility be
placed upon the ground of its being a part of the res geste, it would
seem that there was such ample cooling time between the hour the
communication was brought to the knowledge of Sullivan, and the
hour of the homicide, that it would not reduce the killing, if done
because of this provocation, from murder to manslaughter.
The propriety of the admission of the testimony to show that the
communication of Hanford to the council was false, is very questionable, because its obvious tendency was to convey the impression
to the jury that the conduct of the deceased was v. matter for their
special consideration and reprobation; and for the further reason
that whether the matter of the conimunication was true or false it
gave the defendant no shadow of right to kill him.
To hold otherwise, would be to put both the right of judging and
the execution of the law into the defendant's own hands-a principle not to be for a moment tolerated in civilized society.
As it was said by the learned judge in Hfare's Case (Wharton on
Homicide, 2d ed. 715), "The law does not and will not permit
any individual or body of men to become their own avenger, and
if they attempt it and injuries to person or property follow, they
are criminally responsible for their conduct. If courts of justice
should once recognise this wild right of private vengeance, it is evident that the bonds of social order and security would be torn
asunder, and the cannon and the musket become the substitute for
the bench and the jury box, in measuring out the nature and amount
of punishment to offenders against public law. The concession of
such a right of self-vindication would be the immediate and complete.demolition of all public safety, the surrender of all the powers
of government and the termination of the supremacy of the law."
The court in one of its instructions to the jury told them that in
the absence of proof tending to show the truth of the charges in the
communication to the council they were bound to find them both

